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RICO CRIMES (Continued)
Case Law Interpreting the RICO Act
As can be clearly seen from section 1961, the list of affiliated activities is quite large and many organizations and individuals can easily find themselves subject to the stiff penalties and sanctions afforded under RICO. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that, while the Act refers to "Criminal Organizations," membership in organized crime is not a necessary element of a RICO conviction. United States v. Uni Oil, Inc. 646 F.2d 946, 953 (5th Cir. 1981).
In order to secure a conviction under the RICO Act, the government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise," and a connected "pattern of racketeering activity." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). An enterprise is an entity, and it can be proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, and by evidence that the carious associates function as a continuing unit. Id. The pattern of racketeering activity is a series of criminal acts, which can be proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. Id. Proof of one, however, does not necessarily prove the other. Id. Furthermore. Racketeering enterprises or racketeering predicate acts do not need to be accompanied by an underlying economic motive. NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259, 261 (1994).
To clarify how each of the three subsections of section 1962 operate, the case Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406 (3rd Cir. 1991) is informative. Under section 1962(a), the plaintiff (or government) must allege an injury specifically from the use or investment of income in the named enterprise; under section 1962(b) the plaintiff (or government) must allege a specific nexus between control of a named enterprise and the alleged racketeering activity; and while section 1962(c) is not subject to these nexus limitations, cases brought under section 1962(c) cannot allege that an entity is both an enterprise and a defendant. Kehr at 1411.
In establishing a pattern of racketeering activity, the prosecutor must show that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel, Co. 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989). This may be done in a variety of ways. Id. at 241. "A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time. Predicate acts extending over a few week or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement." Id. at 242. Congress, apparently, "was concerned in RICO with longterm criminal conduct." Id. If continuity cannot be established by showing longterm activity, "liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is demonstrated." Id. (emph. in original). Because "threat of continuity" depends on the specific facts of each case, it can be sufficiently established "where the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part of a long-term association that exists for criminal purposes." Id. at 242-43. The continuity requirement can also be satisfied by showing "that the predicates are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business (in the sense that it is not a business that exists for criminal purposes), or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO 'enterprise.'" Id. at 243.
Defining an "enterprise" is therefore important. An enterprise can technically exist with only one actor to conduct it, even though it will, in most situations, be conducted by more than one person or entity. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997) (dicta). The existence of a RICO enterprise is shown where
- there is an ongoing organization with a decision-making framework for controlling a group that remains unchanged over time
- various associates function as continuing unit, and
- enterprise is separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1991).